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Abstract
Little is known about how the idea of ‘resilience’ translates into practice. It has nonetheless emerged as a dominant theme
in the governance of crises, such as political instability, armed conflict, terrorism, and large-scale refugee movements.
This study draws on interviews with humanitarian and development practitioners in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon working
under the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan to explore how resilience is interpreted and translated on the ground.
Results suggest that resilience is translated as the economic self-reliance of refugees, and the capacity for crisis manage-
ment of refugee-hosting states, enacted through ‘localization’ and strengthening the ‘humanitarian-development nexus.’
The prominence of the political and economic context and the power relations between crisis response actors that it gen-
erates reveals the limits of what a buzzword like resilience can achieve on the ground. The findings highlight the need
for researchers, policymakers, and practitioners to engage in continuous critical reflection on whether the ways in which
resilience policies and programmes are implemented actually improve the ability of systems and vulnerable populations
to recover from crisis, as well as on the validity of the assumptions and interpretations on which such policies and pro-
grammes are built.
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1. Introduction
‘Resilience’ has emerged as a dominant theme in the
governance of crises such as political instability, armed
conflict, terrorism, and large-scale refugee movements.
Notwithstanding its adoption by the United Nations
(UN) agencies, donors, governments, and (internation-
al) non-governmental organizations ([I]NGOs), resilience
has been criticized for its buzzword-like qualities. Its
ambiguity, in particular, has provoked questions about
the concept’s usefulness for practice (Manyena, 2006)
as it risks becoming “an empty signifier that can easily
be filled with any meaning to justify any specific goal”
(Weichselgartner & Kelman, 2014, p. 249).
Despite these concerns, buzzwords often provide a
sense that “in the midst of all the uncertainties of the
day, international institutions are working together for
the good, and that they have now got the story right and
are really going to make a difference” (Cornwall & Brock,
2005, p. 1043). Against the backdrop of protracted crises
across many regions of the world and unprecedented
numbers of refugees, ‘resilience’ may promise the abil-
ity “to anticipate and tolerate disturbances…without col-
lapse, to withstand shocks, and to rebuild as necessary”
(Lentzos & Rose, 2009, p. 243). Little is known, however,
about how this translates into practice.
The objective of this study is to explore how the
concept of resilience is interpreted and translated into
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practice. It draws on 40 interviews with 47 humani-
tarian and development practitioners in Turkey, Jordan,
and Lebanon working under the Regional Refugee and
Resilience Plan (3RP). This crisis response platform
assists countries surrounding Syria with managing the
influx of large numbers of Syrian refugees—including
through what practitioners have termed ‘resilience-
building.’ Bringing together some 270 humanitarian and
development actors, including governments, UN agen-
cies, national and international NGOs (3RP, 2019), the
3RP constitutes “one of the biggest humanitarian oper-
ations ever realized by the UN” (Dionigi, 2016, p. 27).
I argue that in practice, the concept of ‘resilience’
becomes imbued with particular—even narrow—
meanings contingent on crisis response actors’ inter-
pretations of the context, which in turn determine how
resilience, as a capacity for recovery, is ‘built.’ To what
extent resilience policies and programmes can achieve
results on the ground, however, ultimately depends on
the political and economic context and the power rela-
tions it generates between crisis response actors. In this
way, the results provide empirical evidence for the polit-
ical nature of crisis governance, which, rather than a
technocratic exercise, is “shaped by the people, institu-
tions and history of the context in which crises happen”
(Hilhorst, 2013, p. 5).
The article unfolds as follows. The next section offers
an overview of the literature on resilience (Section 2).
Next, I propose a conceptual framework for understand-
ing the translation of resilience into practice, based on
theories of translation that allow for recognition of, and
sensitivity to, the various dimensions of power and poli-
tics at play in crisis governance (Section 3), followed by a
brief overview ofmethods (Section 4). Subsequently, the
3RP is described in more detail (Section 5), followed by
the empirical material (Section 6). The article concludes
with a discussion of the results and the implications for
research, policy, and practice (Sections 7 and 8).
2. What is Resilience?
Resilience is not a new concept. It stems from the Latin
resilire, whichmeans to ‘leap’ or ‘jumpback.’ Throughout
history, resilience has been used, on the one hand, to
describe the quality of materials to bend without break-
ing (Bourbeau, 2018). On the other hand, it referred to
human character and behaviour: A resilient person pos-
sessed the trait of fickleness andwould cancel or go back
on their word (Alexander, 2013). From the mid-19th cen-
tury onwards, however, resilience started to be used in
the sense of fortitude after a misfortune. A US military
expedition to the east coast of Japan, which had been
struck by the Ansei-Tokai earthquake of 1854, identified
“a resiliency in the Japanese character which spoke well
for their energy. They [the Japanese] did not sit down
and weep over their misfortunes, but, like men, went
to work, seemingly but little dispirited” (Hawks, 1856,
pp. 511–512; see also Alexander, 2013).
The 1970s witnessed a proliferation of theories and
research on resilience in psychology and ecology. Within
psychology, the turn to resilience marked a shift in the
focus on vulnerability and deficiency to protective factors
and adaptive capacities (Masten, 2013, 2018). Within
ecology, resilience was coined as a measure of the ability
of ecological systems to persist despite change and dis-
turbance and to reorganize while maintaining their func-
tions (Holling, 1973; Walker, Holling, Carpenter, & Kinzig,
2004). Intellectual exchange between ecologists and risk
management scholars has likely facilitated the uptake
of resilience in the field of the latter (Clark & Swain,
1975). In the 1980s, resiliencewas championed as a strat-
egy to mitigate the effects of a crisis—being both bet-
ter and cheaper than either anticipation or prevention
(Wildavsky, 1988). Resiliencewas subsequently picked up
by disaster scholars and practitioners, becoming an inte-
gral component of international disaster risk reduction
frameworks (Comfort, Boin, & Demchak, 2010).
In the first half of the 2010s, resilience emerged
as a central axiom of humanitarian and development
aid, reflected in its adoption by major donors, includ-
ing Britain’s Department for International Development,
the United States Agency for International Development,
and the European Commission. In 2016, moreover,
the concept was placed at the heart of the European
Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy, sparking
an impassioned, critical debate about the meaning of
resilience and the repercussions for those at the receiv-
ing end of resilience policies. These critiques can be
organized around three main arguments: First, because
resilience manifests in response to a crisis, i.e., after the
event, it assumes not only the inevitability of crises but
also the insignificance of interrogating the (structural)
causes of crises (e.g., Evans & Reid, 2013, 2014); sec-
ond, resilience tends to responsibilize individuals, com-
munities, and states for their resilience—de facto also
responsibilizing them for their vulnerability (e.g., Ilcan
& Rygiel, 2015; O’Malley, 2010); and third, resilience
may be considered a neoliberal strategy to outsource
security to crisis-affected individuals and communities,
taking responsibility off the shoulders of states or the
international community (e.g., Chandler & Reid, 2016;
Duffield, 2012).
Concerned in particular with the ontologies and epis-
temologies that underpin the global turn to resilience
and with the interrogating resilience discourses in pol-
icy, critical resilience scholarship has thus far not sys-
tematically engaged with how resilience policies are
interpreted and, in turn, implemented by practitioners.
An exception is a study by Aldunce, Beilin, Howden, and
Handmer (2015), which identifies different understand-
ings of resilience among natural disaster management
practitioners, and how these subsequently generate dif-
ferent practices. Moreover, Scott-Smith (2018) argues
that whereas critical scholars have interpreted resilience
as a depoliticizing concept, humanitarian practitioners
have instead denounced it for politicizing their work. This
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paradox points towards the importance of examining
practitioners’ views on policy concepts and how these
shape programme design and implementation. The next
section offers a theoretical framework throughwhich the
implementation of ‘resilience’ can be conceptualized.
3. A Politics of Translation
The various constructivist turns in the study of policy and
politics attest to the growing interest in, and the per-
ceived importance of, the role of ideas and discourse in
policy and political processes (Fischer & Gottweis, 2012).
The role of ideas in policy implementation has nonethe-
less been neglected, mirrored by a lack of attention
to ideas in implementation research (Béland & Ridde,
2016). Exploring how the policy idea of resilience is
put into a set of programmes and operational practices
necessarily engages with this nexus between ideas and
implementation—for which the concept of ‘translation’
may provide a useful theoretical framework.
Weisser, Bollig, Doevenspeck, and Müller-Mahn
(2014) argue that “people do not act according to the
script of a single global idea, but that they appropri-
ate or modify parts of that script and also invent new
ones” (p. 112). Instead, “as policy travels across lan-
guages, sites and scales, it is produced, assembled, enact-
ed and populated differently” (Clarke, Bainton, Lendvai,
& Stubbs, 2015, p. 60). In other words, as ideas travel—
not just across the boundaries of academic disciplines
and policy areas or across geographical borders, but
also from the global to the local and from policy to
practice—they are modified as a result of translation
processes (Weisser et al., 2014). Rather than being sim-
ply implemented, therefore, “policies are interpreted
and ‘translated”’ (Braun, Maguire, & Ball, 2010, p. 549).
“Translation” may be defined as:
[T]he process of modification of policy ideas and the
creation of new meanings and designs in the pro-
cess of the cross-jurisdictional travel of policy ideas.
Translation allows viewing the ‘global’ in ‘local,’ and
‘local’ in ‘global,’ with regard to the adoption, imple-
mentation and travel of ideas and enables simulta-
neous consideration of ideas, objects and interests.
(Mukhtarov, 2014, p. 76)
Importantly, a translation perspective draws attention to
three interrelated aspects of policy implementation: the
transformation of ideas, the agentic capacities of ‘trans-
lators,’ and the role of context.
First, a translation perspective acknowledges that
the process of translating a global policy idea to
a particular locality “always involves transformation”
(Czarniawska & Sevón, 2005, p. 8). Translation indicates
that a policy idea:
Is made to mean something in its new context.
Policy is never a singular entity: it is put together—
or assembled—from a variety of elements that are
always in the process of being re-assembled in new,
often surprising ways. (Clarke et al., 2015, p. 10)
Ideas are “edited, translated, and cobbled together from
various sources for idiosyncratic use” (Powell, Gammal,
& Simard, 2005, p. 237). This means that ‘resilience,’
translated to the operational context of the 3RP, will be
imbued with meanings different from those attributed
to the more abstract notion of resilience in global policy
frameworks.
Second, translation processes involve ‘translators’:
actors who actively interpret and transform ideas in
accordance with the context within which they operate.
Traditional perspectives have tried to capture the travel
of ideas in terms of policy ‘transfer’ or ‘diffusion,’ which
imply “a central broadcast point andwide reception with
rather passive receivers” (Powell et al., 2005, p. 233).
Ideas, however, “do not travel by themselves, nor are
they pushed around by forces such as regionalisation,
neoliberalism, or globalisation” (Mukhtarov, 2014, p. 76).
A translation perspective instead underlines the agentic
capacities of translators, and unlike much policy imple-
mentation research, leaves behind assumptions of ratio-
nality and intentionality (Mukhtarov, 2014). Translators
“always act according to existing interests and always
operate within certain power relations, [therefore] they
are likely to transform concepts according to very partic-
ular intellectual, epistemological, political, and historical
requirements” (Neumann & Nünning, 2012, p. 9).
Third, Braun, Maguire, and Ball (2010) note that
“[p]utting policies into practice is a creative, sophisti-
cated and complex process that is always also locat-
ed in a particular context and place” (p. 549, emphasis
added). Translation is a process of recontextualization
(Braun, Ball, Maguire, & Hoskins, 2011) that is “character-
ized by selective appropriations and translations accord-
ing to historical and local circumstances” (Neumann &
Tygstrup, 2009, p. 1). The outcome of translation pro-
cesses is thus contingent on the various political, eco-
nomic, and social incentives that exist within the partic-
ular context—and are meaningful only within that con-
text (Mukhtarov, 2014; Weisser et al., 2014). Because
translation always serves an interest (Freeman, 2009),
“some things are made visible while others are hidden or
erased” (Clarke et al., 2015, p. 49). This enables a politics
of translation (Clarke et al., 2015) that allows for explor-
ing the role of power relations in how policy ideas trans-
late into practice.
As ideas, because they travel from the global to the
local and from policy to practice, a politics of transla-
tion perspective calls attention to idea transformation,
the role of actors, and the impact of contextual factors.
These aspects provide the analytical tools to explore the
context-specific meanings of a global policy buzzword
like resilience, and how it is translated into practice by
various actors working under the banner of the 3RP in
Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan.
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4. Methods
Forty semi-structured interviews of approximately one
hour were held with 47 humanitarian and develop-
ment practitioners between October 2018 and June
2019 in Gaziantep, Amman, and Beirut, as well as over
Skype. Relevant organizations were initially identified
from 3RP documentation, including the regional strate-
gic overview and the 3RP country chapters. Potential
respondents were subsequently identified from organi-
zations’ websites, policy documents and publications, or
from country-specific online civil society platforms, such
as the Lebanese website www.daleel-madani.org. They
were approached via email or social media for a face-to-
face or Skype interview.
Respondents represent 32 different organizations.
Nine (28%) are Turkish, Jordanian, or Lebanese civil soci-
ety organizations operating at the national level (referred
to as national CSOs), or organizations established by
Syrians in Turkey (referred to as Syrian-led CSOs). Twenty-
three (72%) are international organizations, with head-
quarters outside Turkey, Jordan, or Lebanon. These
included 15 INGOs, five UN agencies, and three dif-
ferent governmental organizations, including a diplo-
matic mission, a donor agency, and a network orga-
nization. At least 23 respondents (49%) were Turkish,
Lebanese, Jordanian, or Syrian nationals—the remain-
der were international expats. Seventeen respondents
were female (36%), 30 were male (64%). Nearly all
respondents held management positions in the area of
programmes, coordination, or partnerships. For some,
their work focused exclusively on the national (Turkish,
Lebanese, or Jordanian) context, others (also) worked
at the regional level, i.e., across the different 3RP coun-
tries, or on cross-border operations into Syria. Theywere,
therefore, familiar with the national and regional poli-
cy discussions and processes, as well as their organiza-
tions’ programmes and impact thereof on the ground.
Respondents were thus in a good position to talk about
how resilience translates into practice. Due to the politi-
cal nature of the crisis, respondents remain anonymous.
Respondents were asked about the crisis response,
their understanding of resilience, and what resilience
means within an operational context. In addition, they
were asked about the roles of and the relationships
between the different actors involved in crisis response,
including the Turkish, Jordanian, and Lebanese govern-
ments, UN agencies, INGOs, and Turkish, Jordanian,
Lebanese, and Syrian-led CSOs.
Interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed ver-
batim. Written transcripts were subjected to a themat-
ic analysis to “identify or examine the underlying ideas,
assumptions, and conceptualizations—and ideologies—
that are theorized as shaping or informing the seman-
tic content of the data” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 85).
This included familiarization with the data (e.g., reading
and re-reading interview transcripts) and coding using
Atlas.ti. Themes were constructed by clustering codes
into meaningful patterns and refined through an itera-
tive examination of the themes in relation to each oth-
er and the research question. Together, the themes tell
“a story that is based on, and about, the data, that makes
sense of the patterning and diversity of meaning” (Terry,
Hayfield, Clarke, & Braun, 2017, p. 30).
5. Setting the Scene: The Regional Refugee and
Resilience Plan
One year after pro-democracy protests in the south-
ern Syrian town of Dara’a spread across the country
triggering a violent crackdown from the government,
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had
registered 40,000 refugees crossing Syria’s borders into
Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq (United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 2012). In response,
the agency launched the first Regional Response Plan
(RRP) in March 2012 to address “the needs for protec-
tion and assistance of refugees fleeing from the Syrian
Arab Republic” (UNHCR, 2012, p. 4). The years that fol-
lowed not only witnessed Syria spiral into a complex
multi-layered conflict drawing in a growing number of
non-state armed groups and international actors, but
also saw refugee-hosting countries grapple with the
rapidly increasing numbers of refugees. By late 2014,
UNHCR had registered 4,270,000 Syrian refugees in
Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Egypt (3RP, 2014).
Recognizing the impact of the Syria crisis on the
region, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) intro-
duced a ‘resilience-based’ development response to
the Syria crisis in 2014 (Gonzalez, 2016). Whereas
resilience discourses were largely absent in UNHCR’s
RRPs, UNDP argued that “[w]here situations and con-
ditions have stabilised, and people and communities
are coping and beginning to recover, development assis-
tance that builds resilience can accelerate their recovery
and enhance their capacities to prosper independently”
(UNDP, 2014, p. 16).
The 3RP was launched in December 2014, combining
UNHCR’s short-term humanitarian emergency response
with UNDP’s longer-term development approach, in
what is known among practitioners as the ‘humanitarian-
development nexus’ (see also Hilhorst, 2018). The New
Way of Working—one of the outcome documents of
the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit—describes the
nexus as humanitarian and development actors working
towards collective outcomes, based on their compara-
tive advantage in terms of capacity and expertise (United
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs, 2017).
The 3RP resilience component addresses “the
resilience, stabilization and development needs of
impacted and vulnerable communities and aims to
strengthen the capacities of national actors to lead the
crisis response” (3RP, 2019, p. 20). It defines resilience as
“the ability of individuals, households, communities and
institutions to anticipate, withstand, recover and trans-
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form from shocks and crises” (3RP, 2019, p. 9). As central
tenets of a ‘resilience approach,’ the plan specifically
refers to the need to “increase self-reliance and self-
sufficiency of vulnerable populations through market-
based skills training and employability, income genera-
tion opportunities and entrepreneurship programmes”
(3RP, 2019, p. 9) and to “work together with govern-
ment, national and local institutions to strengthen exist-
ing service delivery systems, to identify vulnerabilities
and address needs and risks…and improve capacities to
manage future shocks” (3RP, 2019, p. 9). It does not,
however, clarify how these activities lead to resilience
as defined in the 3RP.
6. Results
6.1. Understanding Resilience in the 3RP Context
First, in line with 3RP discourse and across the dif-
ferent contexts, ‘resilience’ was above all understood
in terms of self-reliance. As one respondent explained,
“building resilience is about creating a conducive envi-
ronment for refugees, host communities, government,
municipalities—all stakeholders—to take care of them-
selves without or with less external support, in a sustain-
able way” (interview 13-J13, network organization). This
was seen to apply to both individuals and the state, as
another respondent pointed out:
The resilience of beneficiaries is the capacity of a per-
son to take care of their basic needs, and the capac-
ity to cope positively with difficult situations. Then
there is the organizational perspective, of NGOs, of
national government. This doesn’t mean building the
resilience of each individual in the country, but of
the national structure of the country. (interview 6-J6,
INGO)
More specifically, system resilience was understood as
the capacity of the state to continue responding to the
crisis without breaking under the pressure of the addi-
tional demands of a large refugee population for pub-
lic services and resources. This generated a focus on
strengthening the political, economic, and social sys-
tems and structures that exist at local and national lev-
el. Individual resilience was more narrowly understood
as economic self-reliance, with a focus on access to
employment—particularly of refugees residing in urban
areas. In the words of one respondent: “you can’t have
resilience if you can’t have the ability to work” (interview
10-J10, INGO). Another respondent in Turkey explained:
From the field, we hear that most refugees are think-
ing about staying here. Also, the situation in Syria is
not settled down…we don’t know if a political solu-
tion will come. So, we need to increase refugees’
employability and increase their self-reliance. So that
when they are here in Turkey, they are working and
generating an income to survive. (interview 37-T12,
UN agency)
Second, these context-specific understandings of
resilience were rationalized based on respondents’
understanding of the context as a protracted crisis
occurring in middle-income countries. Respondents rec-
ognized that the unpredictability of the situation in
Syria demands thinking beyond the traditional short-
term time horizons of emergency aid, and towards
longer-term solutions, regardless of whether Turkey,
Jordan, and Lebanon accept the possibility of refugees’
long-term presence, let alone employment. According to
one respondent:
Resilience means durable, long-term solutions. It
includes empowerment, community-based protec-
tion, it includes improving the capacity of the state
institutions—all these are components of resilience.
The main idea of resilience is long-term solutions.
Without resilience, all solutions are temporary, mean-
ing a waste of money, waste of resources, and waste
of time. (interview 39-T14, Turkish CSO)
Respondents felt that ‘resilience-building’ was not only
necessary because of the protracted nature of the cri-
sis, but also because, unlike themore traditional contexts
of humanitarian and development work, Turkey, Jordan,
and Lebanon are middle-income countries. As a respon-
dent in Jordan observed:
I don’t think anyone would deny the reality that you
have a very strong structure. It’s a middle-income
country, there are qualified professionals, there is for-
eign investment….You have political and bureaucratic
mechanisms, there is an administration….I mean, it’s
a country with a strong state, it’s not as if you were
implementing in a failed state like Somalia. (interview
13-J13, INGO)
This has required a different way of working, because,
as another respondent admitted: “Obviously, a lot of
us worked in countries where there’s almost no state,
and we’re used to create these parallel systems because
there is no government system that can do it” (inter-
view 26-T1, UN agency). In the context of a middle-
income country, ‘resilience-building,’ in terms of tapping
into and strengthening the existing political, econom-
ic, and social systems and infrastructures, makes more
sense and is more sustainable than setting up paral-
lel structures which only disappear once international
actors leave.
Third, respondents identified two primary practices
of ‘resilience-building’: the first occurring through the
strengthening of the ‘humanitarian-development nexus,’
and the second through ‘localization.’
Respondents largely understood the humanitarian-
development nexus as a combination of, on the one
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hand, humanitarian assistance for refugees (as per the
traditional UNHCR mandate), and, on the other hand,
development assistance for refugee-hosting states and
vulnerable host communities. Especially the dual focus
on refugees and vulnerable host communities was seen
as a necessary strategy to prevent potential social ten-
sions resulting from selective aid provision:
It’s a vulnerability approach, which is logical. If you’re
living in northern Jordan and suddenly your village
has doubled its population, and all the Syrians get
humanitarian aid…cash assistance…that doesn’t work.
Everyone realized quite early on that if we don’t also
provide assistance to host communities, things will go
wrong. (interview 9-J9, diplomatic mission)
The need to connect humanitarian aid and develop-
ment assistance was furthermore rooted in respondents’
understanding of crises as complex, where the emer-
gency, early recovery and development phases overlap
rather than forming an orderly sequence. Donors seem
reluctant to accept this reality, however, as a respondent
in Lebanon described:
Donors were turning a blind eye to the refugees in
informal settlements who still have nothing. They’re
indebting themselves, they have no jobs, and they’re
just living by whatever the international communi-
ty provides. Donors kind of decided that this can’t
happen anymore, this can’t be there anymore, this
only happens at the beginning of a crisis, emergency
should be over now, we should focus on other things.
Theywould say “we’re six years into the crisis, how the
heck can you still have this?” (interview 16-L3, INGO)
Another challenge to realizing the humanitarian-
development nexus may be the relationship between
UNHCR and UNDP (see also Zetter, 2020). In the words
of one respondent: “The cultural differences between
the organizations, it’s just profound” (interview 5-J5,
UN agency).
Respondents interpreted localization broadly as the
involvement of Turkish, Jordanian, and Lebanese actors.
At the level of state actors, localization meant own-
ership of the national government and authorities
at the local level, e.g., municipalities, over the crisis
response. Respondents perceived these actors as having
the ultimate responsibility for responding to the needs
of their population—including refugees—necessitating
their position in ‘the driver’s seat.’ At the level of non-
state state actors, localization meant specific practices
within INGOs, such as employing Turkish, Jordanian,
Lebanese, or Syrian staff and partnering with Turkish,
Jordanian, Lebanese, or Syrian-led CSOs.Moreover, local-
ization also involved ‘building the capacity’ of such part-
ner organizations with a view to an eventual handover.
These ‘localization strategies’ have led to varying degrees
of involvement of Turkish, Jordanian, and Lebanese state
and non-state actors, which is discussed inmore detail in
the next sub-section.
Summing up, the concept of resilience is largely
understood in terms of self-reliance, which can be ‘built’
through strengthening the humanitarian-development
nexus and through localization. What this looks like in
practice, however, depends on the political, economic,
and social context of the three countries. Although a sys-
tematic country comparison is beyond the scope of this
article, the next section discusses prominent examples
from each context.
6.2. The Contextual Limits to ‘Building Resilience’
6.2.1. Turkey
Respondents characterized Turkey, above all, as a
strong state with a capacity to lead on the response.
As one respondent asserted: “Unlike Jordan and
Lebanon, Turkey is a player in its own right” (interview
20-J14, INGO). Initially, Turkey’s Disaster and Emergency
Management Presidency (AFAD) was responsible for
overseeing the crisis response, a role that was later
handed over to the Directorate General of Migration
Management. Some respondents observed that few
international actors were used to working in a strong
government context:
The UN has experience working with very weak gov-
ernments. They are used tomanaging everything, get-
ting all the information they need. And they thought
they could work like that in Turkey. In Jordan, the
UN agencies are managing everything, the cash pro-
grammes, collecting iris scan data…you can’t do that
in Turkey. (interview 32-T7, Turkish CSO)
At the same time, suspicion, expulsion, and detainment
of staff have proven Turkey a challenging work envi-
ronment especially for INGOs (see also Boztaş, 2019;
Cupolo, 2017;Mellen& Lynch, 2017). Respondents point-
ed out that Turkey wished to limit western donors’ influ-
ence, accusing international organizations of lacking the
proper registration or of financing terrorist organizations.
Nonetheless, the Turkish government was seen as under-
standing of the need for ‘durable solutions,’ engaging
with, in particular, the Turkish private sector to provide
refugee employment.
Typical for Turkey was the rise and professionaliza-
tion of Syrian-led NGOs (organizations established by
Syrians in Turkey) engaged in both the refugee response
within Turkey and cross-border operations into Syria.
Respondents saw their involvement as an important
way to localize the crisis response, but also noted chal-
lenges, in particular with regards to the funding sys-
tem. Specifically, in the absence of a direct link between
institutional donors and Syrian-led (or otherwise Turkish,
Jordanian, and Lebanese) organizations, funding is chan-
nelled through INGOs and typically limited to project-
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specific costs—excluding costs related to staff salaries,
rent, and administration (see also Field, 2016). Donor
requirements remain another stumbling block, as one
respondent explains:
One of the conditions of ECHO [European Civil
Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations] is to be
registered in Europe for five years. So, as a local orga-
nization, it’s not possible to get funding from ECHO.
There are also requirements with regards to capaci-
ty….And we have been working on our capacity since
we registered in Turkey in 2014, but even then, we’re
still a new organization. You can’t expect us to live up
to the standards of Oxfam or Save the Children. (inter-
view 38-T13, Syrian-led NGO)
Another respondent shared an example whereby their
local partner received a direct grant, but also put this into
perspective: “It’s good…but it’s also too late. After eight
years, we’re talking about one partner who got direct-
ly funded by an institutional donor” (interview 27-T2,
INGO).
The examples from the Turkish context show how
national governments may secure state-level localiza-
tion by limiting the humanitarian space for internation-
al actors. At the same time, the funding structures of the
international aid system limit the possibilities for localiza-
tion at the level of non-state actors. These findings chal-
lenge the concept of localization and the extent to which
it can ‘build resilience.’
6.2.2. Jordan
From the start of the crisis, the Jordanian government
was involved in decision-making, planning, and coor-
dination. It appointed the Ministry of Planning and
International Cooperation (MoPIC) as the lead agen-
cy and established a secretariat and information man-
agement system. Nonetheless, respondents expressed
their frustration with the Jordanian crisis response sys-
tem in terms of its bureaucracy, lack of capacity, and
instances of corruption. In particular, respondents com-
plained about the time it took the government to grant
project approval—in some extreme cases taking over six
months to a year. This was dependent on the relation-
ship between INGOs and line ministries, as one respon-
dent illustrated:
I had a good relationship with MoPIC, my projects
were often approved within a month. But I remem-
ber other organizations had a hellish relationshipwith
them…government is like “I don’t like you, you can
wait.” Why? In the end, I’m sorry to say, it’s person-
al. (interview 4-J4, INGO)
Project approval also depends on how aid is divid-
ed between Syrian and Jordanian beneficiaries.
Respondents explained that under the 3RP protection
and resilience pillars, projects must target at least 30%
and 70% vulnerable Jordanians, respectively. In this way,
Jordan ensures that both humanitarian and develop-
ment assistance benefits its own citizens. As with pre-
vious waves of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees, several
authors have noted Jordan’s tendency to leverage its
position as a refugee-hosting state to increase access to
international aid (Arar, 2017; Kelberer, 2017; Tsourapas,
2019). Respondents did not seem to find this particular-
ly problematic, however, justifying this strategy on the
basis of Jordan’s stagnant economy, high unemployment,
and lack of resources.
Under the European Union (EU)–Jordan Compact,
Jordan agreed to provide refugee employment in
exchange for EU aid and the relaxation of the require-
ments for exporting to EU markets. Respondents
observed, however, that the nature of the Jordanian
economy—predominantly informal and largely depen-
dent on the public sector and armed forces—makes
refugee employment an unlikely reality:
The official figures of more than 100,000 work per-
mits should not be taken as the reality; most of them
are inactive. Itwas a condition imposedby the interna-
tional community within the Brussels conference and
the Jordan Compact, but it’s very difficult for the gov-
ernment to put that into place in an informal econo-
my. A lot of Jordanians are working informally, they
don’t have a contract, they don’t have social security,
they don’t pay taxes…how can you expect Syrians to
have a better legal framework than the Jordanians?
(interview 13-J13, network organization)
These examples from the Jordanian context show
how national governments may use the humanitarian-
development nexus to capitalize on the presence of
refugees. The findings also illustrate how, irrespective
of international agreements, refugee employment ulti-
mately depends on the nature and state of host coun-
tries’ economies. This challenges the usefulness of the
concept of resilience, if narrowly defined as economic
self-reliance.
6.2.3. Lebanon
In Lebanon, the government initially pursued a “poli-
cy of no-policy” (Nassar & Stel, 2019), leaving it up to
UNHCR to respond to the increasing number of Syrian
refugees. When the Lebanese government eventually
intervened, it did so by suspending UNHCR’s refugee reg-
istration services in 2015 (Janmyr, 2018). Unlike Turkey
and Jordan, Lebanon did not allow for the establishment
of official refugee camps, a decision respondents felt was
influenced by Lebanon’s experience with the Palestinian
refugee camps and their perceived role in the civil war
(see also Turner, 2015).
Lebanese authorities have maintained a hostile
refugee discourse, emphasizing the temporariness of
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refugees’ stay and calling for their return to Syria.
Moreover, it has actively created a restrictive environ-
ment to discourage refugees from remaining in Lebanon.
Besides the prohibition of refugee employment, high fees
for residency permits and ambiguous enforcement of fee
waivers, curfews, illegal detentions, discrimination and
exploitation, the government has publicly attacked inter-
national actors for assisting refugees. As one respondent
pointed out: “Policymakers andministers herewill accuse
anyone, humanitarian agencies, the UN, the internation-
al community, of wanting the refugees to stay and that
this is why they are granting so much assistance” (inter-
view 15-L2, UN agency). Another respondent illustrated:
There was a lot of momentumwhen the Russians pro-
posed a plan for returning refugees. The Lebanese
media and politicians created a real hype because
everybody wants the refugees to go back. We spoke
out against it and said that it’s not safe to go back.
UNHCR got hit over the head by the foreign minis-
ter, and this is why they are still struggling to renew
the residence permits of their staff. (interview 16-L3,
INGO)
Respondents noted resistance from the Lebanese gov-
ernment to the idea of resilience (see also Culbertson,
Oliker, Baruch, & Blum, 2016; Fakhoury, 2019). In light
of Lebanese politicians’ anti-refugee rhetoric, this is
not surprising, given the conceptualization of resilience
as refugees’ economic self-reliance, which necessitates
access to employment opportunities. In turn, the gov-
ernment anticipates that refugees’ employment would
facilitate their integration into Lebanese society rather
than encourage return to Syria. One respondent suggest-
ed that:
They didn’t want to use the 3RP terminology, they
used stabilization instead. I don’t know what the
issue of the government with resilience was, I think
it was too long-term or something like that. So, they
used stabilization. But I think even that has worn out
because everybody has been overtaken by the reali-
ty that this is just a protracted crisis. (interview 16-L3,
INGO)
What this will mean for Lebanon, which besides the
refugee crisis is struggling with political instability, high
unemployment, and more recently, widespread protests
against corruption, economic collapse, and the outbreak
of Covid-19, remains unclear. The Lebanese context
clearly shows how host country politics characterized by
hostility and resistance restrict the space for ‘resilience-
building’ programmes. The findings underline the crucial
role of CSOs to navigate the political context and find
ways to prevent refugees and host communities from
becoming increasingly vulnerable.
Together, these examples show that, within the con-
text of the 3RP, ‘resilience,’ defined in 3RP documenta-
tion as the ability to “anticipate, withstand, recover and
transform from shocks and crises” (3RP, 2019, p. 9), nar-
rowly translates into a focus on economic self-reliance at
the individual level, and as crisis management capacities
at the state level. Justified by practitioners’ understand-
ing of the needs and the context, this interpretation of
resilience is put into practice by linking humanitarian and
development assistance, as well as engaging in practices
of ‘localization.’ Ultimately, however, what the concept
of resilience can achieve on the ground is constrained
by the structural challenges inherent to the political and
economic context, especially the relations between inter-
national actors on the one hand, and Turkish, Jordanian,
Lebanese, or Syrian actors on the other.
7. Discussion
This study finds that practitioners associate ‘resilience’
predominantly with ‘self-reliance,’ echoing earlier
findings by, for example, Aldunce et al. (2015).
Conceptualized as economic self-reliance, moreover,
resilience mirrors the neoliberal tendencies in estab-
lished refugee self-reliance discourses, which portray
the ideal refugee as an entrepreneur with “the skills,
capacity and agency to stand on their own and sustain
themselves without depending on external humanitari-
an aid” (Easton-Calabria &Omata, 2018, pp. 1458–1459).
As Easton-Calabria and Omata (2018) note, however,
“employment opportunities do not necessarily lead to
refugee self-reliance, nor are they alone a remedy for
protracted situations” (p. 1459).
The examples from Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon illus-
trate that refugees’ access to employment opportuni-
ties hinges on host countries’ willingness to provide
the necessary enabling environment (Easton-Calabria
& Omata, 2018; Krause & Schmidt, 2020). Resilience-
programming, in the form of “market-based skills train-
ing and employability, income generation opportunities
and entrepreneurship programmes” (3RP, 2019, p. 9) is
a farce in the face of poor host economies and hostile
political environments. Moreover, the reality of refugee
employment is often defined by exploitation, vulnerabil-
ity, and discrimination (Mencutek & Nashwan, 2019)—
unlikely antecedents of either self-reliance or resilience.
Nonetheless, the focus on access to jobs seems firm-
ly entrenched within contemporary refugee governance
(UNDP, International Labour Organization, &World Food
Programme, 2017).
Despite the convergence of their meanings as prac-
titioners understand them, resilience and self-reliance
are not the same things. As Krause and Schmidt (2020)
point out, “self-reliance mainly suggests that refugees
can support themselves, [whereas] resilience indicates
their broader ability to absorb and deal with difficult situ-
ations and crises” (p. 23). Rather than a similarity to self-
reliance or self-reliance as a constitutive element, the-
oretical explorations of resilience instead point to the
importance of social networks and interdependencies
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(Aldrich & Meyer, 2015). This demands inquiry into the
motives behind the coalescence of resilience and self-
reliance discourses in practice, even more so in the light
of indications that self-reliance discourses have been
used to justify the reduction of assistance (Hunter, 2009).
This study also finds that practitioners understand
resilience-building as strengthening refugee-hosting
states’ capacities to manage the impact of the Syria
crisis—particularly the pressure created by increased
demand for public services. Inasmuch as Turkish,
Jordanian, Lebanese, and Syrian-led CSOs are largely
excluded by virtue of the very structure of the inter-
national crisis response system, ‘localization’ is narrowly
translated to ‘nationalisation.’ Critical analyses of the
localization agenda within humanitarian and develop-
ment assistance have already called into question the
local-international binary that “results in blind spots in
the analysis of exclusionary practices of humanitarian
action” (Roepstorff, 2020, p. 285).
On the one hand, emphasis on the responsibility
of the governments of Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon—
under the header of ‘localization’ or ‘local ownership’—
diverts attention away from the responsibility of the
international community to ensure more equal burden-
sharing. Elsewhere, I have argued that under the guise
of resilience, the EU pursues a refugee-containment
strategy that risks the further destabilization of Jordan
and Lebanon rather than “build their resilience” (Anholt
& Sinatti, 2020). On the other hand, nationalisation
risks legitimizing what Tsourapas (2019) has described
as “refugee rentiering.” He argues that Turkey, Jordan,
and Lebanon have employed “their position as host
states of forcibly displaced populations to extract rev-
enue, or refugee rent, from other state or non-state
actors” (Tsourapas, 2019, p. 465). In this way, ‘resilience-
building’ may be a win-win for refugee-hosting states
and donor governments wishing to keep refugee popu-
lations outside their borders, but a lose-lose situation
for refugees.
8. Conclusions
This article has examined how the concept of resilience
is translated into practice. Findings from interviews with
humanitarian and development practitioners working in
the context of the 3RP in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon
illustrate how resilience takes on the meaning of self-
reliance as it travels from the global to the local, and
from policy to practice. Above all, the findings demon-
strate the power of the political and economic context
to restrict the agential capacities of ‘translators,’ reveal-
ing the limits of what policy buzzwords can achieve on
the ground.
For policymakers and practitioners, continuous crit-
ical reflection on the interests and agendas that
inform context-specific interpretations of resilience and
whether ‘resilience-building’ programmes and opera-
tional practices actually improve the ability of systems
and vulnerable populations to recover from a crisis
is paramount. For resilience scholars, the next step is
the in-depth examination of the—possibly conflicting—
varieties of resilience that are likely to exist within
and across different contexts, how these translate into
divergent practices, and what impact these have on
the ground.
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